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Introduction
Large tracts of the South Island high country are farmed 
under leases that are perpetually renewable at the discretion 
of the lessee. Changes in views about the optimal use 
of the high country have resulted in the government 
instituting a tenure review process, under which the 
Crown is negotiating with the owners of South Island 
pastoral leases to redefine the property rights associated 
with those leases. As a result of tenure review, the portions 
of these pastoral estates that have high conservation and/
or low farming value are being returning to the Crown 
under management of the Department of Conservation 
(DOC), while those portions of the estates that have 
high value in farming or other uses are transferred to the 
freehold ownership of the former lessee. 
In an article published in the last Policy Quarterly, Ann 
Brower (2007) suggested that tenure review is producing 
outcomes that are:
•	 consistent	with	no-one	advocating	for	the	Crown’s	
interest, based on the Crown tacitly agreeing to ‘lose’ 
in the negotiation process;
•	 consistent	with	officials	acting	to	close	the	deal	at	
any costs, so that the deals struck strongly resemble 
the lessees’ demand curve for freehold land;
•	 inconsistent	with	the	relevant	law	on	property	rights.
In this paper I first review the tenure review process and 
the property rights issues associated with this. Second, I 
provide an analysis of the evidence presented by Brower. 
Thirdly, I conclude with an alternative view of the key 
public policy issues and suggest that the tenure review 
process is a positive one for New Zealand.
Property rights
A property right provides the right to use resources for 
certain purposes, and the holder of a property right is the 
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person or group with the ability to exercise the relevant 
use rights. There is no simple match between allocations 
of property rights and the concept of ownership as it is 
used in popular language.
In the case of a perpetually renewable lease, the 
allocation of property rights makes the concept of 
ownership extremely complex. These leases limit the 
range of activities that farmers may undertake on the 
land, and require that the farmers pay rent to the Crown 
based on unimproved land values. But in other respects 
the leases approximate freehold rights to occupy and 
use the land, exclude others from using the land, and 
transfer their rights to others.2 So, despite the Crown’s 
interest as a lessor, land subject to pastoral lease is not 
‘public’ land; the Crown must negotiate agreed terms 
if it wishes to review tenure without breaching the legal 
rights of the lessee.
The lessees hold title to a perpetually renewable 
leasehold estate, which means that land covered by 
pastoral leases is not ‘public’ land that is available for 
allocation at the discretion of the Crown, but rather 
land alienated into private hands by the Crown. The 
fact that the alienation occurred through a perpetually 
renewable lease rather than a transfer of the fee simple 
(freehold property rights) does not change the fact that 
alienation has occurred. 
Similarly, it is incorrect to claim that retention by the 
Crown of the use rights except pastoralism provides 
the Crown with valuable property rights in pastoral 
leases. The Crown alienated the ability to exercise those 
rights when it issued the lease by virtue of providing 
1 This paper draws on earlier work with Lewis Evans and my 
correspondence with Ann Brower and Philip Meguire. 
2  In fact there is a market for both lessees’ and lessors’ interests 
in perpetually renewable real estate in New Zealand, providing 
market reference points for valuation (see, for example, Boyle et 
al., 2008).
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leaseholders with a perpetually renewable right to 
exclusive occupation and quiet enjoyment of a pastoral 
estate.3 The Crown has no rights to do anything with the 
land except collect rent and adjudicate on any activities 
proposed that are not permitted under the lease, unless 
the lessee chooses to sell their interest in the land to the 
Crown or not to renew the lease at the point of renewal. 
In other words, whatever alternative rights the lessor 
might have are of no value at all unless we can assign a 
positive probability of a lessee quitting the lease at the 
time of the review. 
Tenure review negotiations
A key driver of the tenure review policy is the desire of 
the government to see large parts of the land currently 
under pastoral lease added to the conservation estate. 
This is important in two respects. First, it establishes 
the nature of the demand for the purchase of the lessees’ 
rights by the Crown. Second, it tells us something about 
the Crown’s demand for leasehold rights; the Crown 
should be prepared to pay any price up to the perceived 
conservation value obtained by adding the land to the 
conservation estate. 
The economic basis for the negotiation between the 
lessee and the Crown begins with the fact that the lessee 
has rights of occupancy in perpetuity, and the Crown 
must induce the lessee to give up those rights for any 
land that is returned to the conservation estate. Similarly, 
for land that will be retained by the lessee in freehold 
title, the lessee must compensate the Crown for giving 
up its interest as lessor. In addition, there may be features 
of the property that provide it with value over and above 
those anticipated when the pastoral leases were originally 
drawn up – in particular, value for commercial tourism 
and for rural-residential lifestyle and privacy. Thus, 
to understand the values established as part of tenure 
review we need to ascertain:
•	 the	value	of	the	lessee’s	interest	in	the	total	leasehold	
area covered by each review;
•	 the	 value	 of	 the	 lessor’s	 interest	while	 the	 land	 is	
subject to lease in perpetuity; and
•	 the	value	of	 those	 features	of	 the	 land	that	might	
impact on its market value but are not part of the 
asset base on which the rent is set, and a division of 
that value between lessee and lessor.4
Tenure review is a process by which economic assets 
are transferred from private to public ownership: 
extinguishing lessees’ rights is a process of transferring 
economic assets from private ownership to the Crown. 
Since more land subject to pastoral lease is given up than 
is transferred into freehold land (the difference being the 
land added to the conservation estate), it would probably 
be more accurate to describe tenure review as a process 
of nationalisation than of privatisation.
To illustrate the way in which the tenure review process 
works, and values payable for the Crown and the lessor 
are established, I summarise in Table 1 the outcomes 
from two tenure reviews. Lease #1 was described by the 
valuers as a property with low productivity in pastoral 
farming and limited improvements by the lessee, while 
Lease #2 was described as having a high productivity in 
farming and has substantial improvements put in place 
by the lessee. Consistent with this, 72.2 % of the land in 
Lease #1 was transferred to DOC, while 27.4% of the 
land in Lease #2 was acquired by the Crown.
The data from these two tenure reviews illustrate two 
important points in the process. First, valuers employed 
by the lessee and valuers employed by the Crown assess 
the market value of the pastoral estates, and apportion 
this between the lessee and the Crown as lessor (50% 
in both cases). Second, in assessing the Crown’s interest, 
two factors are important: the present value of the 
rental payments, and an apportionment between the 
two parties of those values that are not counted in the 
rental value.
The Crown’s interest in the land transferring to freehold 
is generally smaller than in the land transferring to 
DOC, because the land transferring to freehold will 
generally have been the focus of lessee improvements 
that raise its value but do not raise Crown’s interest.
The Crown’s interest in the poor quality estate is 
lower because the limited productivity of the estate in 
pastoralism meant that the rent payable was low on a 
per hectare basis.
3 A perpetually renewable lease provides the lessee with the option, 
at each point of renewal, to determine the lease and the flow of 
rental payments to the Crown, or to acquire the freehold rights 
should the Crown wish to sell them. While this right to determine the 
lease may rarely be invoked, it does provide an option to the lessee 
that is valuable, and would be exercised if ever (for example) the 
rental payments were set at such a high level as to undermine the 
economic viability of the permitted activity (pastoral grazing).
4 For a full and very clear description of the valuation approach taken 
in tenure review see Armstrong et al. (2005).
V
ol
um
e 
4,
 N
um
be
r 
1 
20
08
45
Pastoral Lease #1 Pastoral Lease #2
Ha AMV % Ha AMV %
 $(000)   $(000)  
Land Transferring to D.O.C. 5278 2885  1249 1452  
– Lessee’s interest  2580   1012  
– Crown’s interest  305 10.6  440 30.3
Land Transferring to Freehold 2136 1090  3305 5598  
– Lessee’s interest  1015   4358  
– Crown’s interest  75 6.9  1240 22.2
Total Capital Value  7414 3975   4554 7050  
– Lessee’s interest  3595   5370  
– Crown’s interest  380 9.6  1727 24.5
Reconciling the Crown’s Interest       
– Present value of rent  32   927  
– Crown’s interest in non-rentable value  348   800  
Table 1: Comparison of two tenure review outcomes
The proportion of the Crown’s interest in Lease #1 is 
much lower because the present value of rental payments 
is so small. It would have been less than 1% if not for 
an apportionment to the Crown of 50% of the value 
in non-rentable values.
Defining the Crown’s interest
Brower (2007) presents the results of an analysis of 
data relating to 77 completed tenure reviews. She does 
not indicate that the graph presents the result of a 
regression analysis rather than data drawn directly from 
the tenure revew documents, and she does not define 
the Crown’s interest. The definition of the dependent 
variable in her regression is given in Brower, Monks and 
Mequire (2007) as CI = P
L
/(P
L
 + P
C
), where P
L
 is the 
price per hectare received by the Crown for the land 
acquired by the lessee as freehold and P
C
 is the price 
per hectare received by the lessee for the land acquired 
by the Crown. 
To illustrate the problem, consider a simple numerical 
example: if the per hectare value of the freehold land 
acquired by the lessee is $1,000 and the per hectare value 
of the land acquired by the Crown is $500, then P
L
 / (P
L
 
+ P
C
) = $1,000/$1,500 = 0.67. The interpretation of the 
numerator, P
L
, is clear, but what interpretation can be 
placed on the denominator $1,500? It is the sum of two 
values per hectare, but what does that mean in economic 
terms? The lessee and the Crown acquire different types 
of land, suitable for different uses, and with different 
values in those different uses. What concept is captured 
by adding those two per-hectare values together, and 
how does this relate to the Crown’s interest?
With some algebraic manipulation, it is possible to 
show that the inverse relationship between the Crown’s 
interest and the percentage of the lease transferred to 
freehold in Brower’s analysis reflects the fact that in 
many tenure reviews the value of the required payment 
to the Crown was around 70% of the value of the 
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required payment to the lessee for land acquired by 
DOC.5 Given the concentration of lessee improvements 
on the land transferred to freehold and thus the lower 
percentage of the Crown’s interest in the total value of 
that land, this is hardly surprising.
To consider the implications of Brower’s definition of 
the Crown’s interest, Table 2 compares her definition 
with the calculation of the Crown’s interest drawn 
from the agreed valuations in each tenure review. As 
can be seen, Brower’s method produces a definition of 
the Crown’s interest that is materially different from 
the actual proportion of the capital value attributed to 
the Crown in the tenure review outcomes for the leases 
considered here. 
As an indication of the benefits that might come from a 
qualitative analysis of the actual valuations determined 
in tenure review, consider the ‘dots’ (as Brower calls 
them) at the bottom right of her Figure 4. These suggest 
that in some transactions, 100% of the leasehold land 
was retained by the lessee, but that the Crown’s interest 
was assessed to be zero. Since these data relate to just 
three individual tenure review transactions, and since 
the data in the reviews are publicly available and readily 
interpreted, why does Brower not provide some more 
detailed analysis of those individual transactions to 
inform the reader of the circumstances in which this 
result occurred and to convince us that the results of 
her data analysis are actually meaningful?
Table 2: Comparison of two definitions of the Crown’s interest
Conclusion
The public naturally has an interest in tenure review 
since it is motivated by the fact that alternative and 
multiple uses of the land, rights of access for recreation, 
and permanent restoration to conservation estate now 
assume much more importance for the public than they 
did 50 or 100 years ago (see Evans & Quigley, 2003). 
Consistent with this change in social preferences, 
tenure review has resulted in hundreds of thousands 
of hectares of land formerly leased to farmers being 
added to the conservation estate. In addition, the 
transfer of some land to freehold tenure is socially 
beneficial because this more easily facilitates multiple 
use of land, and alternative uses of land, than did 
the pastoral leases. Payments of cash and freehold 
land represent the necessary costs associated with 
the creation of improved conservation and land use 
outcomes in the high country as they are valued by 
contemporary society. 
The analysis in this paper suggests that Brower’s dissent 
from the outcomes of the tenure review process rests on 
three factors: (i) an interpretation of the property rights 
of lessees that is at variance with the interpretation of 
those property rights normally adopted by valuers and 
economists; (ii) claims about the process of establishing 
values in tenure review which are inconsistent with 
the information that is publicly available; and (iii) a 
regression analysis which has an independent variable 
with no clear economic interpretation, and therefore 
produces output which makes no contribution to our 
understanding of tenure review. 
5 My proof of this proposition is not reproduced here, but has been 
provided to Brower and Meguire, and is available to readers of this 
article on request.
Pastoral Lease #1 Pastoral Lease #2
% %
Tenure Review Valuations   
Crown’s interest (from Table 1) 9.6 24.5
Brower’s Definition
P
L
/(P
L
 + P
C
) (from data in Table 1) 6.6 31.7
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